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TORT LAW-SURVIVAL OF ACTION-PROPRIETY OF EXPANDING 
MASSACHUSETTS SURVIVAL STATUTE TO EMBRACE INTENTIONAL 
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTREss-Harrison v. Loyal Protective 
Life Insurance Co., 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2477, 396 N.E.2d 987. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Harrison v. Loyal Protective Life Insurance CO.l probed the 
question whether an action in tort for the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress survives the victim's death. Marie Harrison, ad­
ministratrix of her husband's estate, brought this action in January 
1978 in the Suffolk County Superior Court following her husband's 
death from cancer.2 Defendants included her husband's former em­
ployer, Loyal Protective Life Insurance Company (Loyal), Loyal's 
Board Chairman, Victor Sayyah, and Edward Fitzwilliam, an officer 
of the company.3 Plaintiff alleged that Fitzwilliam knew Harrison 
had terminal cancer. Because of his illness, Harrison was precluded 
from working and was required to submit a claim for physical disa­
bility benefits .. Fitzwilliam allegedly threatened Harrison, declaring 
that if he sought the benefits to which he was entitled, Harrison's 
position with Loyal would be terminated.4 
Mrs. Harrison apparently felt that her husband's condition was 
exacerbated by the dilemma over whether to apply for benefits. She 
submitted that as a result of this dilemma, her husband suffered 
mental distress and severe anguish.5 Implicit in the complaint was 
the contention that because of defendants' conduct, the quality of 
Harrison's remaining life was greatly diminished. Plaintiff averred 
that Fitzwilliam's action constituted a deliberate infliction of mental 
harm and, as a direct result, Harrison lost all hope of living. His 
I. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2477, 396 N.E.2d 987 (1979). 
2. Id. at 2477, 396 N.E.2d at 988. Sayyah was Chairman of the Board of Directors 
and leading shareholder in the Holding Corporation of America, which controlled Loyal 
Protective Life Insurance Company. Fitzwilliam was alleged to actually have committed 
the tort. Id. 
3. Brief for Appellant, app. at 3, Harrison v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 1979 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 2477, 396 N.E.2d 987 [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant). 
4. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2478, 396 N.E.2d at 988. Because the trial court dis­
missed the action without making findings of fact, the supreme judicial court summa­
rized the facts from plaintiffs complaint. See id. at 2484, 396 N.E.2d at 991-92. 
S. Id. at 2478, 396 N.E.2d at 988. 
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state of mind may well have led to his physical deterioration and 
ultimate death from cancer.6 
Mrs. Harrison's prayer for judgment was dismissed in the supe­
rior court for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted.7 The court held that the cause of action did not survive Mr. 
Harrison's death.8 Plaintiff later sought review in the appeals court; 
and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, on its own initiative, 
ordered direct appellate review.9 Chief Justice Hennessey authored 
a reversal of the superior court's determination and held that the tort 
of intentional infliction of emotional distress, whether accompanied 
by physical injury or not, survives the death of both the victim and 
the tortfeasor. lO 
The Commonwealth's survival statute I I permits survival of tort 
actions for "assault, battery, imprisonment or other damage to the 
person."12 Harrison rejected a longstanding policy in Massachusetts 
that had constrained the survival statute's operation to include only 
those actions resulting in physical harm to a victim. 13 The basis for 
this policy has not been articulated clearly but seems to be avestige 
ofthe common-law rule wherein tort actions abated at the death of a 
party.14 This common-law mandate has been modified by statute;15 
but, according to the traditional construction of "damage to the per­
son," damage of a physical character was required. '6 Prior to Harri­
son, mental or emotional injuries, such as those sustained by 
plaintiffs husband, would not have triggered the statute and the 
right of action would have been extinguished at death. Such a re­
strictive reading of "damage to the person" would deny redress in a 
6. Brief for Appellant, app. at 9, supra note 3. Mrs. Harrison sought to recover one 
million dollars in damages against Fitzwilliam and against Loyal and Sayyah under a 
theory of respondeat superior. Id. at 5-6. 
7. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2478, 396 N.E.2d at 988. 
8. Id. at 2477-78,396 N.E.2d at 988. 
9. Id. at 2478, 396 N.E.2d at 988. 
10. Id. at 2482, 396 N.E.2d at 991. 
11. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 228, § 1 (West 1958 & Cum. Supp. 1981). The 
survival statute provides that "[i]n addition to the actions which survive by the common 
law, the following shall survive ... (2) Actions of tort (a) for assault, battery imprison­
ment or other damage to the person; ...." Id. 
12. Id. 
13. See cases cited notes 57 & 76 infra. 
14. See Putnam v. Savage, 244 Mass. 83, 84-85, 138 N.E. 808, 809 (1923). This 
common-law rule was expressed in the maxim, actio personalis moritur cum persona. 
Publix Cab Co. v. Colorado Nat'l Bank, 139 Colo. 205, 214, 338 P.2d 702, 707 (1959). 
15. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 228, § 1 (West 1958 & Cum. Supp. 1981). 
16. Putnam v. Savage, 244 Mass. 83, 86, 138 N.E. 808, 809-10 (1923). 
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case that, at minimum, warrants jury consideration.I7 
William Shakespeare once advised, "Things without ... rem­
edy should be without regard; what's done is done."18 This sugges­
tion of resignation, however, is at odds with the maxim of the law 
that for every wrong there is a remedy. 19 Harrison resolved this con­
flict in two steps. First, it affirmed earlier deCisions estab~shing that 
the right to mental tranquility is a protected interest and that dam­
ages are appropriate for an intentional disruption of peace ofmind.20 
Second, in sustaining the validity of an action based on this disrup­
tion, the supreme judicial court considered the nature of the tort. 
The. court held that the intentional infliction of emotional distress 
constitutes "damage to the person" and thereby survives the victim's 
death.21 In the final analysis, Harrison embraced the belief that "the 
business of the law [is] to remedy wrongs that deserve it ...."22 
This note will examine the survival statute and the changing 
judicial conceptions of the statute's scope. An analysis of how the 
statutory language is construed will demonstrate that 3;n expansive 
reading of "damage to the person" is warranted. Additionally, a dis­
cussion of policy considerations attending actions for emotional dis­
tress will underscore the propriety of allowing Mr. Harrison's cause 
of action to survive his death. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Common-Law Nonsurvival Rule 
Mrs. Harrison's action based on her husband's injury survived 
his death because the supreme judicial court placed intentional in­
fliction of emotional distress within the phrase "damage to the per­
son." The survival statute thus operated to defeat defendants' claim 
17. "Because reasonable men could differ on these issues, ... 'it is for the jury, 
subject to the control of the court,' to determine whether there should be liability ...." 
Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 145,355 N.E.2d 315, 319 (1976) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, comment h (1965». 
18. W. SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, III, ii, II. 
19. Throckmorton, f)amages/or Fright, 34 HARV. L. REV. 260, 265 (1921). 
20. In George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 359 Mass. 244, 268 N.E.2d 915 (1971), the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court imposed liability for intentionally causing severe 
emotional distress with resulting bodily harm. Id. at 255, 268 N.E.2d at 921. This ruling 
was extended in Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140,355 N.E.2d 315 (1976), in 
which the court held "that one who, by extreme and outrageous conduct and without 
privilege, causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emo­
tional distress even though no bodily harm may result." Id. at 144,355 N.E.2d at 318. 
21. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2482, 396 N.E.2d at 991. 
22. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 51 (4th ed. 1971). 
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that the cause of action abated at the death of plaintifi?s husband.23 
Part of the significance of Harrison lies in its juxtaposing emotional 
trauma with the concept of damage to the person. This expansive 
view deviates from the supreme judicial court's traditional reading 
of the survival statute, which has been more typical of the stringent, 
common-law nonsurvival rule.24 Generally, new legal theories may 
be analyzed and supported by viewing older approaches from an up­
dated perspective. Tracing the development of the common-law 
rule, which terminated tort actions at the party's death, highlights the 
haphazard evolution of nonsurvival and vindicates Chief Justice 
Hennessey's judicious construction. 
At early common law, tort actions did not survive the death of 
either the person injured or the wrongdoer: As the actor died, so 
died the action.25 "This [abatement] was expressed 'in the maxim 
actio personalis moritur cum persona ."26 Although this is a familiar 
maxim of English law, its origin and significance are obscure.27 It 
has been speculated that the nonsurvival rule developed because, 
historically, tort remedies were associated with criminal law and 
were vindictive in nature.28 Early civil actions were closely allied 
with criminal appeals of felony, thus damage awards originally were 
"regarded as a matter of personal vengeance and punishment."29 A 
party's death, therefore, erased the purpose of a civil action. 
The alliance between embryonic tort law and criminal law30 
fostered the reasoning that "[s]ince the defendant could not be pun­
ished when he was dead, it was natural to regard his demise as termi­
nating the criminal action, and tort liability with it."31 The 
23. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2480, 396 N.E.2d at 990. 
24. See generally cases cited notes 57 & 76 infra. 
25. Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 67 (1913). The common-law 
prohibition against survival did not apply to contract actions, but did apply to tort ac­
tions "founded on malfeasance or misfeasance to the person or property of an­
other...." Hooper v. Gorham, 45 Me. 209, 213 (1858). 
26. Publix Cab Co. v. Colorado Nat'l Bank, 139 Colo. 205, 214, 338 P.2d 702, 707 
(1959). See also Winfield, Death as Affecting Liability in Tort, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 239 
(1929). 
27. Publix Cab Co. v. Colorado Nat'l Bank, 139 Colo. 205, 214, 338 P.2d 702, 707 
(1959). 
28. W. PROSSER, supra note 22, § 126, at 898 (nonsurvival rule was result of devel­
opment of tort remedy as "an adjunct and incident to criminal punishment"); Winfield, 
supra note 26, at 242 (civil remedy had strong quasi-criminal character). 
29. Smedley, Wrongful Death-Bases ofthe Common Law Rules, 13 VAND. L. REV. 
605, 608 (1960). 
30. Publix Cab Co. v. Colorado Nat'l Bank, 139 Colo. 205, 214, 338 P.2d 702, 708 
(1959). 
31. W. PROSSER, supra note 22, § 126, at 898. 
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association between tort and criminal matters, however, became 
more tenuous as the function of damages shifted from punitive to 
compensatory purposes.32 The principle of monetary compensation 
was furthered; and the civil action was extricated from its roots in 
. criminallaw.33 
Although the genesis of actio personalis moritur cum persona 
largely is speculative, its justification is apparent. Because of the 
perceived affinity between the tort of trespass and criminal law, the. 
abatement of the punitive action logically might have been extended 
to the newer civil proceeding. "If one has the habit of looking upon 
a wrong as something very like a crime, it is a natural inference that 
none ought to be liable for it except the man who committed it. "34 
This justification no longer is valid. Civil remedies no longer 
are perceived as appendages of criminal law; the nonsurvival rule 
therefore is archaic. Actio personalis moritur cum persona has been 
subjected to universal criticism condemning it as unfounded and un­
just.35 Assuming as its basis the vindictive character of suits for civil 
injuries, "once the notion of vengeance has been put aside and that 
of compensation substituted, the rule. . . seems to be without plausi­
ble ground."36 Accordingly, the nonsurvival mandate has been de­
scribed as one of the least rational concepts of our law.37 Its roots 
are found in "archaic conceptions of remedy which have long since 
lost their validity. The reason having ceased the rule is out of place 
and ought not to be perpetrated."38 
Applications of the rule have been perceived as arbitrary. For 
example, while personal tort actions always have died with the per­
son, contract actions, which are equally personal, have survived.39 
32. Smedley, supra note 29, at 607 (footnotes omitted). 
33. Id. 
34. Winfield, supra note 26, at 242. 
35. See, e.g., Publix Cab Co. v. Colorado Nat'l Bank, 139 Colo. 205, 216, 338 P.2d 

702,708 (1959) ("non-survival rule is a vestige of the ancient concept of violent torts, and 

owes its existence to historical accident and blind adherence to precedent"); Rodgers v. 

Ferguson, 89 N.M. 688, 691, 556 P.2d 844, 847 (Ct. App.) (no valid justification for com­

mon-law nonsurvival rule), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 7, 558 P.2d 619 (1976); Moyer v. 

Philips, 462 Pa. 395, 399, 341 A.2d 441, 442-43 (1975) (survival statutes enacted to modify 

harsh and unjust rule of common law); Note, Inadequacies ofEnglish and State Survival 

Legislation, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1008,1012 (1935) (limited scope of survival rule attributa­

ble to conservatism of legislatures). 

36. Moyer v. Phillips, 462 Pa. 395, 398, 341 A.2d 441, 442 (1975) (quoting F. POL­
LACK, LAW OF TORTS 62 (12th ed. 1923». 

37. Id. 
38. McDaniel v. Bullard, 34 Ill. 2d 487, 494, 216 N.E.2d 140, 144 (1966). 
39. W. PROSSER, supra note 22, § 126, at 898. 
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"Neither the distinction between tort and contract nor that between 
injuries to personalty and those to property has been consistently fol­
lowed in determining survival."40 The criticism against the nonsur­
vival doctrine has weighed overwhelmingly in favor of its 
abrogation.41 
B. Statutory Alteration of the Common-Law Rule 
This obloquy prompted statutory alteration to such a degree 
that, at present, little remains of the nonsurvival rule in its original 
form. The stringent effects of nonsurvival have been ameliorated 
over the years. The first inroad on the ancient rule, albeit a small 
one, was made by the Statute of Marlborough in 1267, which al­
lowed survival of actions commenced by abbotts for the recovery of 
stolen church goods.42 In 1327, Parliament enacted the Statute of 
Westminster, which provided executors of the estates of those slain 
in a recently concluded civil war with an action for replevin of their 
testators' personalty.43 Three years later, a more significant altera­
tion was provided by an act allowing survival in favor of executors 
who sought recovery of their testators' goods and chattels from tres­
passers.44 "And there for nearly five centuries the law stood almost 
still."45 . 
The impact of these enactments on the nonsurvival rule was 
minimal. "These statutes did not cover torts against land, and made 
no provision for survival of the death of the defendant. . . ."46 Par­
liament, however, took bolder action with legislation in 1833.47 The 
1833 Act allowed suits in trespass or case for wrongs to the real or 
personal property of the victim against the executor or administrator 
of the wrongdoer's estate.48 This series of revisions culminated, in 
40. Note, supra note 35, at 1008-09. 
41. "We have nothing positive to say in defence [sic) of the maxim [the nonsurvival 
rule). If it were elided from our legal literature, nothing would be lost." Winfield, supra 
note 26, at 253. The rule "has no champion at this date, nor has any judge or law writer 
risen to defend it for 200 years past." Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 581, 
162 S.W. 584, 586 (1914). 
42. 52 Hen. III, c. 28 (1267). 
43. I Edw. III, c. 3 (1327). 
44. Statute of Westminster, 1330,4 Edw. III, c. 7. ''The Act of 1330 did not cover 
injuries to a man's person, freehold, or personal reputation ...." Winfield, supra note 
26, at 243. 
45. Winfield, supra note 26, at 243. 
46. W. PROSSER, supra note 22, § 126, at 899. 
47. Civil Procedure Act, 1833, 3 & 4 Wm. IV, c. 42, § 2. 
48. Id. "[E)ven here, the suit was limited to injuries inflicted by the wrongdoer 
within six months of his death. Futhermore, courts continued to insist on an enrichment 
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England, with the Law Reform Act of 1934, which markedly circum­
vented the nonsurvival rule.49 Under the provisions of this Act, all 
causes of action survived, whether for or against the estate of the 
decedent. Causes of action for defamation, alienation of affections 
in the marital relationship, and seduction specifically were 
excluded.50 
American courts paralleled the British evolution, which favored 
survival of tort actions upon the death of a party.51 Statutes have 
modified the common-law rule in all American jurisdictions.52 The 
passage of the Massachusetts survival statute testifies to the antiqua­
tion of the common-law doctrine. 
C. The Massachusetts Survival Statute 
In Massachusetts survival is "wholly the creature of statute."53 
Survival or abatement under the survival statute depends on the na­
ture of the wrong sustained, not on the form of the action. 54 Any 
case falling within the ambit of the statute will survive if the action is 
based on one of the enumerated torts or if the character of the al­
leged injury fits the rubric of "damage to the person."55 The policy 
behind the statute seems confused because of a contradictory posture 
of the wrongdoers' assets in order for the suit to survive against his representative." Ma­
Ione, The Genesis 0/ Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1043, 1047 (1965). 
49. See id. 
50. Note, supra note 35, at 1010. 
51. W. PROSSER, supra note 22, § 126, at 899. "In a variety of cases, in order to 
extend the remedy against the representatives of a party deceased, the form of the action 
[had) been changed so as to evade the application of strict technical rules." Stebbins v. 
Palmer, 18 Mass. (I Pick.) 71, 75 (1822) (emphasis in original). 
52. " '[T)he rule has been the subject of legislative modification both in England 
and America.''' Publix Cab Co. v. Colorado Nat'l Bank, 139 Colo. 205, 220, 338 P.2d 
702,710 (1959) (quoting Kelley v. Union Pac. R.R., 16 Colo. 455, 457, 27 P. 1058, 1059 
(1891»; see Evans, A Comparative Study ofthe Statutory Survival of Tort Claims/or and 
Against Executors and Administrators, 29 MICH. L. REV. 969 (1931). 
There is a distinction between survival statutes and wrongful death statutes: 
Acts designed to alter the common-law restriction on the transmission of tort 
claims or tort liability at death are commonly known as survival statutes, while 
legislation aimed at establishing a separate cause of action for the benefit of 
designated members of the family of a person whose life was wrongfully taken 
are usually referred to as wrongful death statutes. 
Malone, supra note 48, at 1044. 
53. Putnam v. Savage, 244 Mass. 83, 85, 138 N.E. 808, 809 (1923) (citing Duggan v. 
Bay St. Ry., 230 Mass. 370, 376, 119 N.E. 757, 759 (1918». 
54. Id. at 88, 138 N.E. at 810; Hey v. Prime, 197 Mass. 474, 476, 84 N.E. 141, 142 
(1908); Cutter v. Hamien, 147 Mass. 471, 473, 18 N.E. 397, 398 (1888). 
55. See, e.g., Stebbins v. Palmer, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 71, 74 (1822); Note, supra note 
35, at 1008. 
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assumed by the Massachusetts courts. The nonsurvival rule has 
been denigrated,56 yet, prior to Harrison, the courts narrowly con­
strued "damage to the person" and imposed stringent restraints on 
the operation of the survival statute. 57 An analysis of Massachusetts 
cases spotlights the bifurcated approach tak-en by the courts. 
An 1822 case, Stebbins v. Palmer,58 illustrates the dichotomy 
that the supreme judicial court tried to resolve in Harrison. 59 Steb­
bins involved an action for breach of promise to marry, a cause held 
to abate at the jilted party's death. The opinion emphasized the na­
ture of the injury and focused on the substance of the action rather 
than on its form or name.60 Breach of promise to marry, an action 
based on disappointed hope and violated faith, was said to be 
"merely personal," distinguishing it from a cause of action that 
would survive a party's death.61 "Merely personal" actions, accord­
ing to the court's reasoning, died with the person.62 Dicta in Steb­
bins suggested the threshold of survival under the statute: If a cause 
of action was based on a personal right of the deceased, something to 
which an administrator could be neither party nor privy, the action 
abated. Conversely, an injury that depleted the victim's estate, or 
enriched that of the perpetrator, was held to trigger the statute and 
56. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 228, § I (West 1958 & Cum. Supp. 1981). 
57. See Dixon v. Amerman, 181 Mass. 430, 63 N.E. 1057 (1902) (action for crimi­
nal conversation and consequent loss of consortium not within survival statute); Cutter v. 
Hamlen, 147 Mass. 471, 18 N.E. 397 (1888) (survival of action depends on nature of 
damage sued for); Cummings v. Bird, 1I5 Mass. 346 (1874) (despite allegation of damage 
to estate resulting from alleged libel, action abated at plaintiffs death); Norton v. Sewall, 
106 Mass. 143 (1870) ("damage to the person" extends only to harm resulting from bod­
ily injury); Nettleton v. Dinehart, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 543 (1850) (survival statute does not 
embrace action such as malicious prosecution, which ordinarily involves personal char­
acter of deceased); Smith v. Sherman, 58 Mass. (I Cush.) 408 (1849) (survival statute, 
which allows action for damage to the person to survive, extends only to injuries of a 
physical character); Stebbins v. Palmer, 18 Mass. (I Pick.) 71 (1822) (nonsurvival rule 
necessitates abatement of action for breach of promise to marry). 
58. 18 Mass. (I Pick.) 71 (1822). 
59. The Stebbins court read the survival statute very narrowly and yet critized the 
nonsurvival rule: 
That there are cases where the maxim. . . applies cannot now be contested; but 
it is a rule, arbitrary in its commencement, supported only by artificial reason­
ing, and often most unjust in its consequences. The Court certainly will not feel 
disposed to extend it to cases not clearly coming within its application. 
ld. at 74. 
60. ld. at 76. 
61. ld. 
62. "The maxim, actio personalis fmoritur cum personal applies to all personal 
wrongs, whether they arise ex contractu or ex dilecto . ..." ld. at 75. 
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inure to the administrator.63 
This careful distinction seems contraposed with the court's re­
luctance to adhere to the common-law nonsurvival mandate. On the 
one hand, Stebbins strictly limited the' operation of the survival stat­
ute; on the other, it denigrated the nonsurvival rule that frustrated 
the statute's intent. Later cases embodied this apparent duality of 
purpose. For example, Stebbins was a precedent to Smith v. Sher­
man,64 a subsequent action for breach of promise to marry. Chief 
Justice Shaw interpreted the 1842 version of the survival statute and 
opined that "damage to the person" was to be read narrowly. "This 
manifestly extends only to damage of a physical character. . . . If 
the term 'person' were used in a broader sense, it would extend to 
slander and every other possible case of tort, which could not be 
intended."65 
Chief Justice Shaw circumscribed the survival statute's opera­
tion by limiting it to actions based on purely physical injuries. This 
concept of "damage to the person" defined the prevailing interpreta­
tion, which required actual physical damage. Subsequent causes of 
action were lost in cases of malicious prosecution,66 libel,67 and crim­
inal conversation68 because the respective injuries were not con­
strued as within Smllh's concept of "damage to the person." In 1870, 
the same construction was employed in a negligence action that sur­
vived the victim's death. Norton v. Sewall69 permitted an adminis­
tratrix to maintain an action for personal injuries to her testator, who 
negligently was given a fatal dose of poison.70 Justice Gray postu­
lated that "[t]he words damage to the person ...do not ...extend to 
torts not directly affecting the person, but only the feelings or reputa­
tion, such as breach of promise, slander, or malicious prosecu­
tion.... But. ..they do include every action, the substantial cause 
of which is a bodily injury ...."71 
Eighteen years after Norton, Justice Holmes provided an inter­
esting extension to the statute in Cutler v. Hamlen.12 In Cutler, the 
63. Survival was allowed in cases in which wrongs affected the personal estate. Id. 
at 75-76. 
64. 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 408 (1849). 
65. Id. at 413. 
66. See, e.g., Nettleton v. Dinehart, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 543 (1850). 
67. See, e.g., Cummings v. Bird, 115 Mass. 346 (1874). 
68. See, e.g., Dixon v. Amerman, 181 Mass. 430, 63 N.E. 1057 (1902). 
69. 106 Mass. 143 (1870). 
70. Id. at 143. 
71. Id. at 145 (citations omitted). 
72. 147 Mass. 471, 18 N.E. 397 (1888). 
270 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:261 
court denied a motion to dismiss on an allegation that a testator con­
tracted diphtheria due to his lessor's deceit in renting him an in­
fected house. The victim became sick, unable to work, and helpless 
for life as a result of the lessor's action.73 Justice Holmes looked 
beyond the form of the action for deceit and focused on the resulting 
injury to plaintiff. Survival was enabled because the injury sustained 
was seen as "damage to the person" as contemplated by the statute. 
"In such cases the action is not for the deceit alone. . . but for the 
damage caused by the deceit. The nature of the damage sued for, 
not the nature of its cause, determines whether the action 
survives."74 
By allowing the action to survive in Culler, Justice Holmes 
demonstrated an approach consonant with the view that statutes 
dealing with remedies should be construed liberally.75 Injuries to the 
person resulting from fraud, as well as from direct force, could in­
voke the survival statute. Later courts, however, continued to read 
the statute restrictively and required damages from a bodily injury, 
or damages of a physical character, as distinguished from those that 
are suffered only in the feelings or reputation.76 The fundamental 
consideration in these cases was the nature of the wrong sustained by 
the victim. In each instance, the supreme judicial court adhered to 
Chief Justice Shaw's theory, posited in Smith, that "damage to the 
person" was intended solely to encompass damage of a physical 
character. This principle was echoed in every pertinent supreme ju­
73. Id. at 472, 18 N.E. at 397. 
74. Id. at 473, 18 N.E. at 398. 
75. Survival statutes have been described as remedial and interpreted liberally. 
See generally McDaniel v. Bullard, 34 m. 2d 487, 492, 216 N.E.2d 140, 143 (1966); Wynn 
v. Board of Assessors, 281 Mass. 245, 249, 183 N.E.2d 528,530 (1932); Moyer v. Phillips, 
462 Pa. 395,401, 341 A.2d 441, 444 (1975). 
76. E.g., Keating v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 209 Mass. 278, 95 N.E. 840 (1911) 
(action for damages to father resulting from injury to minor son did not survive father's 
death); Hey v. Prime, 197 Mass. 474, 84 N.E. 141 (1908) (consequential injuries to hus­
band arising from injury to wife not viewed as "damage to the person," which included 
only damages resulting from direct bodily injury); Wilkins v. Wainwright, 173 Mass. 212, 
53 N.E. 397 (1899) (action for injury to plaintiff resulting from assault by defendant's 
dogs considered to be of a physical character and, as such, survived defendant's death); 
Cummings v. Bird, 115 Mass. 346 (1874) (action abated at plaintiffs death despite allega­
tion of damage to estate resulting. from alleged libel); Norton v. Sewall, 106 Mass. 143, 
(1870) (damage to the person extends only to harm resulting from bodily injury); Walters 
v. Nettleton, 59 Mass. ( 5 Cush.) 544 (1850) (action for libel did not survive defendant's 
death); Nettleton v. Dinehart, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 543 (1850) (survival statute did not 
embrace action such as malicious prosecution, which ordinarily involves personal char­
acter of deceased). 
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dicial court disposition following Smith.77 
The constraints on survival imposed by Smith and its progeny 
apparently stemmed from a blind a<Jherence to the archaic, com­
mon-law rule wherein tort actions abated at death. This line of cases 
was derived from the strict reading given to the survival statute. 
Such a limited application of the statute impeded its purpose in cur­
tailing the anachronistic, common-law rule.78 Harrison rejected the 
precedent that required damage of a physical character. This rejec­
tion conforms to the state of the law regarding the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, which does not require physical dam­
age to a plaintiff before he is entitled to maintain an action.79 Harri­
son incorporated a fair and justifiable interpretation of "damage to 
the person" and thereby furthered the purpose of abrogating the 
nonsurvival rule.80 
In Harrison, the supreme judicial court, for the first time, con­
fronted the specific issue whether emotional distress is an injury con­
templated by the phrase "damage to the person."81 The opinion was 
based on the court's belief that emotional injury, absent any physical 
manifestation, is properly embraced by the statutory phrase.82 Re­
garding intangible, emotional suffering as "damage to the person" is 
somewhat aberrant in light of the longstanding precedent requiring 
physical injury. Harrison's expansion of the survival statute contra­
vened the previously accepted construction and may have stemmed 
from the court's recent countenance of claims for emotional distress. 
A review of the evolution of judicial decisions toward affording re­
. dress for this type of injury underscores the propriety of Harrison. 
D. Intentional Infliction ofEmotional Distress 
In 1971, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
first was recognized by Massachusetts courts in George v. Jordan 
Marsh CO.83 The hesitancy of the supreme judicial court to grant 
full protection to an individual's peace of mind is not unique to the 
Commonwealth. Professor William Prosser concluded, "Notwith­
77. See notes 57 & 76 supra. 
78. See notes 42-52 supra and accompanying text. 
79. Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 144,355 N.E.2d 315, 318 (1976). 
80. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2481, 396 N.E.2d at 990. See a/so Publix Cab Co. v. 
Colorado Nat'l Bank, 139 Colo. 205, 224-25, 338 P.2d 702, 712 (1959); Rodgers v. Fergu­
son, 89 N.M. 688, 691, 556 P.2d 844,847 (Ct. App.), cerl. denied, 90 N.M. 7, 558 P.2d 619 
(1976). 
81. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2477, 396 N.E.2d at 988. 
82. Id. at 2482, 396 N.E.2d at 991. 
83. 359 Mass. 244, 268 N.E.2d 915 (1971). 
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standing its early recognition in the assault cases, the law has been 
slow to accept the interest in peace of mind as entitled to independ­
ent protection even as against intentional invasions."84 Yet, the 
evolution toward protecting peace of mind testifies to the validity of 
the maxim that mandates a remedy for every wrong.85 
Early judicial approaches toward emotional injury, however, 
were incompatible with this maxim. In 1888, for example, courts in 
England and the United States simultaneously denied recovery for 
injuries from nervous shock.86 Damages would not be awarded for 
injuries due to fright without physical impact. Compensation, how­
ever, was allowed in cases wherein mental distress was caused by a 
tortiously inflicted physical injury,87 or where an action for emo­
tional injury could be couched in terms of a recognized tort.88 In this 
sense, damages for mental injury were seen as parasitic to the in­
dependent tort.89 Thus, in cases such as assault, damages for mental 
suffering could be assessed as a recoverable item.90 The early courts, 
84. W. PROSSER, supra note 22, § 126, at 49. 
85. "If the rule against recovery is not based on reason, it may be expected to yield 
to that which is more in conformity with the maxim of the la~ that for every wrong there 
is a remedy." Throckmorton, supra note 19, at 265. 
86.. An early English case, Victorian Rys. Comm'rs v. Coultas, 13 A.C. 222 (1888), 
denied plaintiff recovery for nervous shock caused by defendant's negligence absent 
proof of actual impact. The court explained that a "mere nervous shock caused by fright 
of an impending event which never happens results from the constitution and circum­
stances of the individual, and does not give a cause of action, to support which there 
must be physical injury ...." Id. at 222. A similar holding was obtained contempora­
neously in the United States, where plaintiff was denied damages for physical injuries 
due to fright without physical impact. Lehman v. Brooklyn City R.R., 47 Hun. 355 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1888). 
87. Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 290, 47 N.E. 88, 89 (1897); Note, 
The Right to Mental Security, 16 U. FLA. L. REV. 540, 541 (1964). 
88. It may well be . . . that the practice of including [mental suffering] in 
recoverable damages arose at a time when courts were not able to force their 
conceptions of legal injuries on juries, that one reason for continuing to recog­
nize it is that the jury always will include it, whether they should do so or 
not. . . . Other instances where "mental suffering" is a recoverable item of 
damages in connection with a cause of action already recognized at law are 
frequent and well known. . . . 
Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L. REV. 497, 509 (1922) 
(footnote omitted). 
89. W. PROSSER, supra note 22, § 12, at 52. The parasitic nature of damages for 
emotional distress foreshadowed their future recognition as an independent tort. "'The 
treatment of any element of damage as a parasitic factor belongs essentially to a transi­
tory stage of legal evolution. A factor which is today recognized as parasitic will. . . . 
tomorrow be recognized as an independent basis of liability.' " Goodrich, supra note 88, 
at 510-11 (quoting T. STREET, FOUNDATION OF LEGAL LIABILITY 470 (1906». 
90. W. PROSSER, supra note 22, § 12, at 52. The question arises as to why assault 
actions were permitted as independent torts while actions for mental suffering were not. 
Mental suffering may result from words "which were more insulting, unendurable and 
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in barring recovery for injury resulting from mere mental distur­
bance, were oblivious to the paradox that parasitic damages were 
freely recoverable while independent torts of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress were denied.91 The leading case of Spade v. Lynn 
& Boston R.R.92 alluded to the policy considerations that prompted 
Massachusetts courts to embrace this rule. 
In Spade, Justice Allen established the "impact requirement," 
which held that bodily injury could cause mental suffering. Recov­
ery for mental distress was proper if it was preceded by physical in­
jury.93 Spade recognized that mental suffering constitutes an actual 
personal injury that can proximately flow from a defendant's action 
and produce physical consequences. Justice Allen questioned the ra­
tionality of allowing damages for physical injury but not for mental 
suffering absent perceptible physical manifestations.94 The Spade 
court, however, siqestepped this inconsistency and focused on ad­
ministrative problems that would attend damage awards for mental 
distress.95 The impact requirement rule, which implied that certain 
injuries were noncompensable, derived from anxiety over the possi­
bility of fabricated claims.96 
This anxiety led to a puzzling result: Spade depicted mental 
injury as a serious intrusion on a person's privacy. Compensation 
for this injury, however, was relegated to the status of a parasitic 
element of damages.97 Chief Justice Holmes commented on this in­
consistency: "The point decided in Spade v. Lynn. . .is not put as a 
logical deduction from the general principles of liability in tort, but 
as a limitation of those principles upon purely practical grounds."98 
The grounds noted by Chief Justice Holmes are rooted in public 
generally provocative than blows. . . . [T)he result was a rule which permitted recovery 
for a gesture that might frighten the plaintiff for a moment, and denied it for menacing 
words which kept him in terror of his life for a month." Id. 
91. Id. at 51-52. 
92. 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897). 
93. Id. at 290, 47 N.E. at 89; see Note, supra note 87, at 542. 
94. "[F)right, terror, alarm or anxiety ...constitute an actual injury. They do in 
fact deprive one of enjoyment and of comfort, cause real suffering, and to a greater or 
less extent disqualify one ...from doing the duties of life." 168 Mass. at 288, 47 N.E. at 
88. 
95. "[T)he real reason for refusing damages sustained from mere fright. . .rests on 
the ground that in practice it is impossible satisfactorily to administer any other 
rule...." Id. at 288, 47 N.E. at 89. 
96. Note, supra note 87, at 544. Implicit in this requirement is a notion that emo­
tional distress is "an intangible, evanescent something too elusive for the. . .common 
law to handle." Goodrich, supra note 88, at 497. 
97. 168 Mass. at 290, 47 N.E. at 90. 
98. Smith v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 174 Mass. 576, 577-78, 55 N.E. 380, 380 (1899). 
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policy considerations.99 Spade presupposed that emotional distress, 
because it may be ephemeral, is not foreseeable. Thus, it would not 
be an appropriate injury to sustain an independent cause of ac­
tion.lOO This supposition apparently addressed itself to the fear of 
frauduleJflt claims. If an independent tort claim required proof of 
physical injury, the possibility of fraud was thought to be minimized 
because physical injury ostensibly is easier to ascertain than mere 
emotional distress. Other public policy considerations invoked to 
justify the impact requirement rule included: The lack of precedent 
for actions based solely on emotional distress; the trepidation that 
allowance of recovery would increase fraudulent litigation; and the 
fear of imprecision in proving and measuring damages from mental 
trauma. lOl 
Counterarguments, however, have effectively assuaged the anxi­
eties attending actions for emotional distress. The.1ack of precedent, 
for example, is not a valid reason for denying redress. The funda­
mental nature of Anglo-American law, which permits progress 
through judicial decision, contradicts such reasoning. No one would 
argue that the law is eternally constrained so that it cannot evolve in 
accordance with changing times and attitudes. 102 
Public policy does not forbid increased litigation to redress 
wrongs. This premise obviates concern about the potential flood of 
lawsuits over emotional distress actions. lo3 There is no evidence that 
judicial flexibility in allowing compensation for mental distress has 
markedly increased litigation. I04 If the volume of litigation does in­
crease, it has been suggested that the proper solution is an increase in 
the number of courts, "not a decrease in the availability of 
99. See generally 168 Mass. at 290, 47 N.E. at 89. 
100. But Spade distinguished actions based on negligence from ones "where an 
intention to cause mental distress or to hurt the feelings is shown, or is reasonably to be 
inferred, as, for example, in cases of seduction, slander, malicious prosecution or ar­
rest...." Id. . 
Although willing to utilize [the impact requirement] when the wrongdoer was 
guilty of simple negligence, the courts balked at protecting him when the quali­
ty of the wrong was more reprehensible. Thus, the courts unanimously have 
held that no impact is required to recover for mentally induced injury when the 
culpability of the wrongdoer is great. . . . 
Note, supra note 87, at 544-45 (footnote omitted). 
101. Throckmorton, supra note 19, at 273-74. 
102. See id. at 274. "[T]he common law has been and still is a living and growing 
thing." Note, supra note 87, at 555 (citing Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198,215,20 So. 2d 
243, 251 (1944». 
103. Throckmorton, supra note 19, at 275. 
104. See id.; Note, supra note 87, at 558-59. 
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justice." lOS 
There is a valid interest in discouraging vexatious litigation, but 
not at the expense of denying recovery for meritorious claims. It is 
the business of the courts to distinguish between fraudulent and 
valid claims on a case-by-case basis. "Denying all recovery merely 
in anticipation of unjust claims would erode the courts' adjudicatory 
function."I06 Courts are empowered to scrutinize "injuries under ap­
propriate standards of proof, rejecting those claims which fail to 
measure up to the standards."107 One such standard requires suffi­
cient evidence to show a factual, causative nexus between the de­
fendant's conduct and the alleged injury.108 In addition, proximate 
cause must be demonstrated. I09 
The difficulty in determining damages should not bar recovery 
in an action for emotional distress. A plaintiff should not be pre­
cluded from bringing an action simply because there is an element of 
uncertainty in assessing damages. 110 'Where nonpecuniary loss re­
sults, judgment for a monetary award may be an inartful device. 
The difficulty in measuring attributable dollar amounts, however, 
has not prevented these awards from being granted to satisfy physi­
calor mental injuries. It is incumbent upon the jury, under judicial 
supervision, to make this determination. III In short, public policy 
justifications "are not so insuperable that they warrant denial of re­
lief altogether."1l2 Basic tort doctrine requiring evidence of causa­
tion and injury helps ameliorate the fears surrounding actions for 
emotional distress. An allegation of intentional infliction of emo­
tional distress must contain adequate proof of both the act that was 
intended to cause the distress and the subsequent injury. This mini­
mizes the potential for fraudulent litigation. I 13 
The interest in protecting emotional tranquility has been advo­
105. Note, supra note 87, at 559. "[E)ven if liberal rules of recovery in this area do 
create more litigation, the price is not too high. When wrongful acts cause serious injury, 
there should be adequate forums to adjudge compensation." Id. 
106. Note, Negligent Infliction of Emotional IJistress in Accident Cases-The Ex­
panding IJefinition ofLiabi/i~-Dziokonski v. Babineau, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1759,380 
N.E.2d 1295, 1 W. NEW. ENG. L. REV. 795, 797-98 (1979). 
107. Note, supra note 87, at 556-57. 
108. Id. at 563. 
109. Id. at 564. 
110. National Merchandising Corp. v. Leyden, 370 Mass. 425, 430, 348 N.E.2d 
771, 774 (1976). 
111. Throckmorton, supra note 19, at 277. 
112. State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 338-39, 240 P.2d 
282, 286 (1952). 
113. See Throckmorton, supra note 19, at 273. 
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cated forcefully.1l4 In 1936, Professor Calvert Magruder wrote, 
"[n]o longer is it even approximately true that the law does not pre­
tend to redress mental pain and anguish 'when the unlawful act com­
plained of causes that alone.' "115 Although Professor Magruder 
argued that mental anguish deserved legal protection, he cautioned 
against extending this protection to trivial matters. "No pressing so­
cial need requires that every abusive outburst be converted into a 
tort. . . ." 116 This caveat is embodied within the Restatement (Sec­
ond) oj' Torts, which strictly limits tort liability to cases wherein the 
intentional conduct of the perpetrator is extreme and outrageous and 
results in severe emotional distress.1l7 Massachusetts case law is in 
accord with this standard. I IS 
Shortly after Spade, Chief Justice Holmes hinted that intention­
ally caused emotional distress may render a defendant liable but that 
the question would remain open until it specifically arose. I 19 In Co­
hen v. Lion Products CO.,120 Judge Wyzanski of the United States 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts echoed Justice 
Holmes and assumed that Massachusetts would impose tort liability 
on a perpetrator of mental trauma. 121 This assumption was vali­
dated in 1971, when the supreme judicial court decided George. Jus­
tice Francis Quirico authored this opinion which recognized a new 
basis of liability for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. 122 
114. See, e.g. , State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 337, 240 
P.2d 282, 285 (1952); Goodrich, supra note 88, at 506-08. 
115. Magruder, Menial and Emotional Disturhance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. 
L. REV. 1033, 1067 (1936). 
116. Id. at 1053. 
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). 
118. Harrison v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2477, 396 
N.E.2d 987; Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140,355 N.E.2d 315 (1976); George 
v. Jordan Marsh Co., 359 Mass. 244, 268 N.E.2d 915 (1971). 
119. Smith v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 174 Mass. 576, 578, 55 N.E. 380, 381 (1899). 
120. 177 F. Supp. 486 (D. Mass. 1959). 
121. Id. at 489. 
122. 359 Mass. at 255, 268 N.E.2d at 921. The George court reviewed the policy 
justifications advanced in Spade that resulted in the "impact requirement": That any 
other rule would be impossible to administer and that expanded recovery would not 
encourage unjust claims. Id. at 247-48, 268 N.E.2d at 916-17. Justice Quirico allayed 
these fears by postulating that these justifications would apply to any claim for emotional 
distress, whether parasitic to a tort recognized at common law or independent of any 
such tort. Id. at 250, 268 N.E.2d at 919. This, however, did not persuade the court to 
abandon its proclivity toward protecting emotional tranquility. George evinced a confi­
dence in factfinding tribunals to discriminate between fraudulent and just claims. "The 
element of speculation is not present to any greater extent than in the usual tort claim 
where medical evidence is offered and the issue of causation must be weighed with great 
care." Id. at 251, 268 N.E.2d at 919. 
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The court favored justice and logic by imposing liability for inten­
tionally caused severe emotional distress with resulting bodily 
harm. 123 
A significant limitation can be gleaned from this holding in that 
liability hinged on, among other things, proof of resulting bodily 
harm. In 1976, five years after George, the supreme judicial court 
expunged this limitation in Agis v. Howard Johnson CO.124 Agis in­
volved an action against the owner and manager of a restaurant who 
threatened to fire his waitresses in alphabetical order until the iden­
tity of the one who had been stealing from the restaurant became 
known. Plaintiff Agis was the first to be summarily dismissed. 125 
She alleged that as a result of this action she sustained emotional 
distress, mental anguish, and loss of wages. 126 
Justice Quirico, in reviewing the facts, reiterated the analysis 
contained in George and enlarged the scope of that holding by al­
lowing Agis to recover for severe emotional distress without proving 
resultant bodily harm.127 Agis employed a test that is defined suffi­
ciently to obviate fears regarding fraud or outbreaks of litigation. 128 
Agis minimized the distinction between the factfinding 
problems juries may encounter in cases with resulting physical injury 
and in those alleging only mental injury. Justice Quirico deemed the 
difficulties inherent in both tasks to be approximately equal. He sug­
gested that the jurors' own experiences could provide cues to aid 
them in determining whether the alleged outrageous conduct would 
cause mental distress. 129 He noted the jurors' awareness of the ex­
tent and character of the disagreeable emotions that may result from 
123. Id. at 255, 268 N.E.2d at 921. 
124. 371 Mass. 140,355 N.E.2d 315 (1976). 
125. Id. at 141,355 N.E.2d at 317. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 144,355 N.E.2d at 318. 
128. According to the court in Agis, a plaintiff must satisfy four elements to prevail 
in a case for the intentional infliction of emotional distress where no bodily harm has 
resulted: 
It must be shown (I) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or that 
he knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of 
his conduct; (2) that the conduct was "extreme and outrageous," was "beyond 
all possible bounds of decency" and was "utterly intolerable in a civilized com­
munity";.... (3) that the actions of the defendant were the cause of the plain­
tiffs distress;. . .and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff 
was "severe" and of a nature "that no reasonable man could be expected to 
endure it." 
. Id at 144-45,355 N.E.2d at 318-19 (citations omitted). 
129. Id at 144,355 N.E.2d at 318; see State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 
38 Cal. 2d 330, 338, 240 P.2d 282, 286 (1952). 
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the defendant's conduct. 130 This suggests that jurors' empathy may 
be more valid in weighing a claim for mental distress than their de­
tached, objective judgment would be when the difficult medical 
question of resulting physical injury arises. 
The supreme judicial court's elimination of the physical impact 
requirement in Agis highlights its determination that problems in­
herent in allowing an action for emotional distress are "outweighed 
by the unfair and illogical consequences of the denial of recognition 
of such an independent tort."131 Agis' viability was affirmed in Har­
rison, in which the requirement of physical damage was unnecessary 
both in the context of triggering the survival statute's "damage to the 
person" clause and in maintaining a cause of action for the inten­
tional infliction of emotional distress. 132 Harrison's expansion of the 
survival statute is a logical consequence of the elevation of emotional 
distress to the status of a personal injury capable of sustaining an 
independent tort action. 
III. ANALYSIS OF HARRISON 
Survival of the emotional distress action in Harrison was predi­
cated upon the divorce of the physical impact requirement from the 
concept of "damage to the person."133 This holding aligned the Agis 
standard, which accepts pure emotional distress as an actionable in­
jury,134 with the survival statute. The Harrison court reviewed the 
history regarding nonsurvival of actions and rejected previous, re­
strictive readings of the survival statute. 135 As a result, the supreme 
judicial court reversed the superior court's dismissal of Mrs. Harri­
son's complaint.136 
Chief Justice Hennessey first rejected the common-law dogma 
130. 371 Mass. at 144,355 N.E.2d at 318 (citing State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. 
Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 338, 240 P.2d 282, 286 (1952». 
131. Id at 142,355 N.E.2d at 317. 
132. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2479-80, 396 N.E.2d at 989. 
133. Id 
134. See generally Savage v. Boies, 77 Ariz. 355, 272 P.2d 349 (1954) (in accord 
with trend in the law, recovery allowed for intentionally caused severe emotional distress 
absent resulting physical harm); Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140,355 N.E. 
2d 315 (1976) (recovery allowed for emotional distress absent showing of physical in­
jury); Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961) (best considered view recog­
nizes an action for severe emotional distress without physical injury provided standards 
safeguarding against false claims are met); Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 
145 (1974) (cause of action may lie for severe emotional distress with or without showing 
of accompanying bodily impact). 
135. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2478-79, 396 N.E.2d at 989. 
136. Id. at 2477, 396 N.E.2d at 988. 
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precluding survival of tort actions after a party's death. J37 The Mas­
sachusetts survival statute abrogated this common-law rule and ren­
dered untenable appellees' reliance on it. 138 After noting that early 
statutory interpretations of "damage to the person" evinced the nar­
row view that damage of a physical character was required, the court 
found these interpretations not germane to Harrison .139 Chief Jus­
tice Hennessey argued that, as Massachusetts courts only recently 
have countenanced claims for the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, judicial constructions of the survival statute predating rec­
ognition of this independent tort cannot be controlling. 140 Explicit in 
the' statute is the legislature's intent that the list of surviving torts 
supplements, rather than limits, those actions that survived at com­
mon law. Under the traditional common-law rule no tort actions 
survived. 141 The legislature, therefore, must have contemplated a 
dynamic common law evolving in the cou,rts subsequent to the enact­
ment of the survival statute. 142 
The nonsurvival rule was spawned in an era of purely violent 
torts and therefore is inapplicable today. 143 This distinction between 
violent and nonviolent torts is not dispositive in any case because the 
survival statute explicitly encompasses both violent torts, such as 
battery, and those involving injuries deemed to cause "other damage 
to the person."I44 The expansiveness of this phrase allowed Chief 
Justice Hennessey to presume that the legislature's intent was to af­
ford courts latitude to determine which unenumerated torts result in 
"damage to the person." Harrison imputed a flexibility to the sur­
vival statute by construing the intent to allow for changing judicial 
conceptions of those injuries that would constitute legally 
137. Id. at 2478-79, 396 N.E.2d at 989. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 2479-80,396 N.E.2d at 989. 
141. Id. at 2479, 396 N.E.2d at 989. 
142. Id. 
It would indeed be unfortunate, and perhaps disastrous, if we were required to 
conclude that at some unknown point in the dim and distant past the law solidi­
fied in a manner and to an extent which makes it impossible now to anwser a 
question which had not arisen and been answered prior to that point. The 
courts must, and do, have the continuing power and competence to answer 
novel questions of law arising under ever changing conditions of the society 
which the law is intended to serve. 
George v. Jordan Marsh Co. 359 Mass. 244, 249, 268 N.E.2d 915, 918 (1971). 
143. See notes 28-41 supra and accompanying text. 
144. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 228, § I (West 1958 & Cum. Supp. 1981). 
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redressable damage. 145 
Massachusetts cases typifying the statute's traditional, narrow 
construction requiring physical impact l46 were distinguished by 
Chief Justice Hennessey because they "were decided at a time when 
the general attitude of the court toward mental or emotional distress 
as a legally redressable harm was more restrictive than it is to­
day."147 Judicial recognition of the right to mental security has in­
creased because of medical knowledge concerning mental 
processes. 148 "As the potential for harm inherent in mental stress 
has become better understood, the courts have become increasingly 
willing to protect mental security." 149 A serious and prolonged inva­
sion of mental security can upset psychological balance, impair bod­
ily functions, and result in severe emotional and physical injury.150 
" 'The fact that it is more difficult to produce such an injury through 
the operation of the mind than by direct physical means affords no 
sufficient ground for refusing compensation, in an action at 
law... .' "151 
After departing from the impact requirement rule,152 Massachu­
setts courts settled in the judicial mainstream by recognizing the re­
ality of injuries induced through the invasion of mental security.153 
Harrison summarized the two comparatively recent cases through 
which the supreme judicial court liberalized its treatment of claims 
based on emotional distress: George, in which the court first counte­
nanced a cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress with resulting physical injury; and Agis, in which the physi­
cal injury limitation was abandoned. 154 Thus, the current philoso­
phy of the Massachusetts judiciary regarding emotional injury has 
145. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2479, 396 N.E.2d at 989. 
146. See cases cited notes 57 & 76 supra. 
147. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2479, 396 N.E.2d at 989. 
148. Note, supra note 87, at 540. 
149. Id. "A merely transitory or mild psychosomatic state caused by mental stress 
should not be considered legally compensable. But if the invasion of mental security is 
serious and prolonged, to the extent that the mind and emotions become distracted, and 
dysfunctionally oriented, then a different conclusion is compelled." Id. at 555. 
ISO. Id. at 554-55. 

lSI. Id. at 551 (quoting Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 215,12 S.W. 59 (1890». 

152. See Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976); 
George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 359 Mass. 244, 268 N.E.2d 915 (1971). Massachusetts ex­
pressly abandoned the impact rule of Spade in Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 
556, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1296 (1978). 
153. Note, supra note 87, at 554; see Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338,341, 210 
S.E.2d 145, 147 (1974). 
154. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2479-80, 396 N.E.2d at 989. 
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crystallized only in the last few years. This suggested to the court 
that the attitude toward emotional distress, which fostered narrow 
constructions of "damage to the person," no longer was viable. 
Chief Justice Hennessey believed that it was time to reexamine the 
survival statute and ascertain its bearing on the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. 155 
A. Evaluation ofthe Language ofthe Survival Statute 
An historical perspective reveals that Harrison contrasts the 
stringent constructions requiring physical damage. 156 Judicial con­
ceptions of legally redressable "damage to the person," as evidenced 
by Harrison and Agis, have expanded to include emotional harm. 
Chief Justice Hennessey asserted that the survival statute is 
sufficiently flexible to allow for a change in the courts' attitude. 157 
The operative phrase in the survival statute only refers to "damage 
to the person."158 This phrase is not limited or altered by any de­
scriptive clause. An adjective such as "physical" does not qualify 
either of the words "damage" or "person." Rather, the phrase stands 
alone and should be read as ordinary meaning dictates without any 
modifying clause. 159 
The court was satisfied that common understanding mandates 
that the statutory language should not be constrained solely to dam­
age of a physical character. 160 Under this analysis, a reasonable defi­
nition of "damage to the person" includes mental injury. The kind 
of the injury, not the form of the action, must control in deciding 
whether to invoke the survival statute. 161 Contemporary judicial 
treatment of emotional injury, as exemplified by Agis, is supported 
by the medical profession's view that this kind of injury can be tangi­
155. Id. at 2480, 396 N.E.2d at 989-90. 
156. See cases cited notes 57 & 76 supra. 
157. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2479,396 N.E.2d at 989. This view of statutory intent 
requires a focus upon the literal meaning of the words in the survival statute Id. at 2480, 
396 N.E.2d at 990. There is precedent for this literalist approach in Putnam v. Savage, 
244 Mass. 83, 138 N.E. 808 (1923): "This statute is general in terms and manifestly is 
designed to include all classes of cases within its scope. It cO!Dprehends all such cases 
whether then existing or thereafter created ...." Id. at 85, 138 N.E. at 809. 
158. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 228, § 1(2)(a) (West 1958). 
159. "Person" is defined as "[a] being characterized by conscious apprehension, 
rationality, and a moral sense ...a being possessing or forming the subject of personal­
ity." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1686 (1971). 
160. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2480, 396 N.E.2d at 990. 
161. Hey v. Prime, 197 Mass. 474, 476, 84 N.E. 141, 142 (1908); Cutter v. Hamlen, 
147 Mass. 471, 473, 18 N.E. 397, 398 (1888). 
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ble and of serious consequence to the victim. 162 Such an attitude 
belies the arbitrary dichotomy between corporal "body" and ephem­
eral "feelings"; between the physical and the metaphysical, that ear­
lier supreme judicial court decisions imposed. 
Harrison failed to consider personal, intangible torts other than 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. By imputing flexibility to 
the survival statute, however, and interpreting "damage to the per­
son" broadly, the court may have expanded the statute's purview to 
encompass any significant injury to the mind or body.163 Clearly, 
the court disfavored abatement of a valid tort action solely because 
of a party's death. l64 Because "damage to the person" now contem­
plates emotional injury, it may be inferred that the court would al­
low survival in cases alleging defamation, malicious prosecution, 
and invasion of privacy. 165 
As the concept of "damage to the person" now markedly has 
increased in scope, it appears that survival or abatement no longer 
hinges on the character of the alleged injury. Rather, survival would 
be allowed in cases alleging sufficiently severe mental as well as 
physical harm. Such a construction of "damage to the person" 
would comport with the broader concept of personal injury, which 
"may be intangible or mental rather than tactile and physical."166 
162. See notes 149-52 supra and accompanying text. 
163. In Harrison, plaintiff alleged facts and circumstances that reasonably could 
have led the trier of fact to conclude that Harrison suffered severe emotional distress 
because of defendants' actions. Because the allegations were sufficient to warrant jury 
consideration, it follows that the survival statute's operation to enable this consideration 
was appropriate. See 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2484, 396 N.E.2d at 992. 
164. See notes 35-41 supra and accompanying text. A recent case decided by the 
supreme judicial court reinforces this conclusion. In DuMont v. GOdbey, 1981 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 51,415 N.E.2d 188, an action by plaintiff wife against her former husband for 
alimony and assignment of property was held to survive the husband's death. In making 
this determination, the court cited Harrison, explaining, "[wJe have recently had occasion 
to consider rules as to survival of actions and we have found the reasons for non-survival 
lacking in current force." Id. at 56, 415 N.E.2d at 191. 
165. This inference was first drawn by Chief Justice Shaw, who wrote that if "dam­
ages to the person" were to be taken to include non-physical torts, it would also be ex­
tended "to slander and every other possible case of tort." Smith v. Sherman, 58 Mass. (4 
Cush.) 408, 413 (1849). More recent courts have agreed with Chief Justice Shaw. See 
generally Cohen v. Lion Prods. Co., 177 F. Supp. 486, 489 (D. Mass. 1959); Moyer v. 
Phillips, 462 Pa. 395, 341 A.2d 441 (1975). 
The analogy has been explained aptly by a commentator in the following fashion: 
"Since the modem theory of torts is essentially compensatory, [tJhere seems to be no 
valid reason why even purely personal actions such as defamation and malicious prose­
cution should [not survive the death of the tortfeasorJ." Oppenheim, The Survival of 
Tort Actions and the Action jor Wrongful Death-A Survey and a Proposal, 16 TuL. L. 
REV. 386,421 (1942). 
166. In re Madden, 222 Mass. 487, 492, III N.E. 379, 381 (1916). 
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Harrison repudiated the distinction between "personal injury" and 
"damage to the person" by envisioning mental trauma as being 
within the ambit of the survival statute. 
B. Po/icy Considerations 
Apart from drawing conclusions from statutory language, Chief 
Justice Hennessey considered whether, as a matter of policy, inten­
tional infliction of emotional distress actions should survive. A spe­
cific fear attending these actions is that the difficulty in proving 
emotional injury might increase the potential for fraud. The poten­
tial for fraud supposedly is reduced if both the victim and the 
tortfeasor are alive at the time of the suit. The Harrison court fol­
lowed Agis in rejecting this argument. 167 
The statutory provision allowing assault actions to survive 
evinces the legislature's opinion that courts are competent to decide, 
after the death of a party, questions involving mental and emotional 
harm. Assault actions, which expressly survive, may involve only 
slight harm or even a mere apprehension of bodily contact. 168 Con­
versely, in order for there to be recovery, injury resulting from inten­
tional infliction of emotional distress must be severe. 169 An 
allegation of tortious invasion of mental tranquility by assault would 
survive. The same rule should apply if the allegation is based on the 
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Abatement of the 
latter action, in light of the survival of assault actions, would be il­
logical. Chief Justice Hennessey was disdainful of the anomaly that 
would result if this were to occur.170 The statute does not compel 
such a result and it is dubious that the legislature would have in­
tended such an illogical consequence. 
Harrison countered defendants' claim that the difficulty in proof 
and the danger of fraud necessitated the court's nonrecognition of 
actions for intentionally caused emotional distress. Chief Justice 
Hennessey was mindful of these inherent threats but was not con­
vinced that they compelled denial of relief for serious invasions of 
peace of mind. The Chief Justice echoed Agis by recognizjng that 
167. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2482,396 N.E.2d at 990-91. 
168. Id. at 2481, 396 N.E.2d at 990. 
169. Id. at 2482, 396 N.E.2d at 990. 
170. Id. at 2481, 396 N.E.2d at 990. In Cohen v. Lion Prods. Co., 177 F. Supp. 486 
(D. Mass. 1959), the court stated that assault required proof of physical contact which 
marked the essential difference between that tort and intentional infiiction of emotional 
distress. Id. at 489. Because Harrison obviates the physical injury requirement, this dif­
ference is no longer relevant. 
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courts and juries are charged with determining the validity or inva· 
lidity of claims. That the task may be difficult does not excuse them 
of their duty to perform it. 171 Indeed, the nature of intentional inflic· 
tion of emotional distress mitigates the potential for excessive fraud. 
Under Agis, the plaintiff must demonstrate what the defendant did 
or said that led to the complaint. The trier of fact then must decide 
whether those actions or words would have caused severe emotional 
distress in a reasonable person. 172 As in the surviving actions of bat· 
tery and contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress actions 
carry standard of proof requirements. 173 Chief Justice Hennessey 
therefore predicted that the confusion resulting from a party's death 
would not be extraordinary.174 
In giving credence to the jury's competence, Chief Justice Hen· 
nessey defused the impact of a problem presented by an exception to 
the hearsay rule. 175 In civil cases, a decedent's declarations can be 
introduced into evidence as long as the statement was made in good 
faith and upon the personal knowledge of the declarant. 176 Thus, a 
plaintiff may introduce prior, good faith statements of a deceased 
victim about his susceptibility and resulting distress, while contem· 
poraneously avoiding the possibility of cross·examination. The 
court, however, concluded that the legislative decision to create this 
exception to the hearsay rule applied in all civil cases. Also, the 
plaintiffs benefit in avoiding cross·examination counterbalanced the 
burden of not being able to elicit testimony directly from the victim. 
The hearsay exception does not require abatement of the cause of 
action by inordinately favoring the plaintiff. 177 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Early cases interpreting the survival statute required the victim 
to endure physical injury in order to prevent abatement of the action 
171. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2482,396 N.E.2d at 990-91 (quoting Agis, 371 Mass. at 
144, 355 N.E.2d at 318). 
172. 371 Mass. at 144-45,355 N.E.2d at 318-19. 
173. Id. 
174. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2483, 396 N.E.2d at 991. 
175. Id. 
176. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 65 (West 1959) provides: 
Admissibility of declaration of decedent. In any action or other civil judicial 
proceeding, a declaration of a deceased person shall not be inadmissible in evi­
dence as hearsay or as private conversation between husband and wife, as the 
case may be, if the coun finds that it was made in good faith and upon the 
personal knowledge of the declarant. 
177. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2483, 396 N.E.2d at 991. 
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at the death of a party. This constraint on survivorship stemmed 
from blind adherence to the archaic, common-law nonsurvival rule. 
The Massachusetts survival statute, however, was designed to abro­
gate this anachronistic rule. 
Harrison v. Loyal Protective Life Insurance Co., 178 focused on 
intentional infliction of emotional distress actions. A cause of action 
based on emotional distress traditionally would have fallen outside 
the ambit of the survival statute if evidence of physical injury were 
lacking. The action would have abated at the death of a party. 
Nothing in the survival statute, however, requires such a restrictive 
construction. 
Statutory language enabling survival of actions merely requires 
"damage to the person" that is not qualified by the imposition of a 
physical injury requirement. The expansiveness of this phrase, and 
the statute's purpose in abrogating the nonsurvival rule, indicate that 
causes of action based on emotional harm, as well as physical dam­
age, should survive. The statute's explicit provision for the survival 
of assault actions, which do not necessarily involve physical damage, 
supports this interpretation. 
Harrison adopted the current standard regarding intentional in­
fliction of emotional distress actions. This standard, as expressed in 
Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 179 is that outrageous conduct must re­
sult in severe emotional distress for there to be an actionable tort. 
Harrison was based on a complaint alleging this degree of emotional 
distress. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court applied the 
Agis standard, which obviates a showing of ensuing physical harm. 
By allowing survival of this action, Harrison juxtaposed the survival 
statute's phrase "damage to the person" with the standard requiring 
severe emotional distress absent some perceptible physical injury. In 
doing so, Harrison incorporated a fair and justifiable interpretaton of 
"damage to the person" and thereby furthered the purpose of abro­
gating the antiquated nonsurvival rule. 
Franklin H. Caplan 
178. Id. at 2477, 396 N.E.2d at 987. 
179. 371 Mass. at 140,355 N.E.2d at 315. 
